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               EARLY COMMENTARIES ON HUME'S WRITINGS


             <Remarks on an Essay concerning Miracles>

                           Anthony Ellys

                                1752

                               5/6/95


Copyright 1995, James Fieser ([e-mail]). See end note for
details on copyright and editing conventions. This is a working
draft; please report errors.[1]

Editor's note: Anthony Ellys (1690-1761) was bishop of St. David's
and the author of <A Plea for the Sacramental Test> (1736), and the
posthumous <Tracts on the Liberty Spiritual and Temporal of the
Protestants of England> (1763-65). Although no publication date
appears on Ellys's <Remarks>, the date of 1752 is usually assigned
to it, which is consistent with the appearance of an April 1752
review of the pamphlet in the <Monthly Review>. Ellys begins his
<Remarks> noting that although Hume claims to attack miracles only
in profane histories, his "true Meaning was not to exempt the
miracles in the holy Scriptures." Ellys believes that fear of divine
punishment, and not just instinct, inclines people to be truthful in
their testimonies. He finds it reasonable that Hume does not try to
prove that miracles are impossible. For Ellys, experience today of
unvaried laws of nature counts only against testimonies of miracles
today. As to Hume's claim that natural experience opposes miracle
testimonies, Ellys counters that just as the Indian prince's
experience against frost does not oppose European testimonies, laws
of nature do not oppose miracle testimonies. He continues that there
is no joint opposition of miracle accounts in rival religions.
First, God allows miracles of false religions to test the believers
of true religion; and, second, rival testimonies oppose each other
on a case by case basis, with the strongest testimony winning. Ellys
argues that Hume's discussion of the alleged miracles of at the
Abbe's tomb was meant to raise prejudices and insinuate that the
Gospel miracles are on the same footing as those. The complete
review of the <Remarks> in the <Monthly Review> is as follows: "The
author of this small piece is both a sensible and genteel writer: he
considers what mr. <Hume> has advanced relating to miracles in a
somewhat different light from dr. <Rutherforth> and mr. <Adams>; but
as mr. <Adams> has so ingeniously shewn the sophistry of mr.
<Hume>'s arguments, (<See> Review <for> January <last>) we shall not
detain our readers with a particular account of what he has said"
(1752, Vol. 6, p. 313). The following is from the 1752 and only
edition of Ellys's <Remarks>.


                              * * * *


                              REMARKS
                                 ON
                              AN ESSAY
                            C/ONCERNING\
                             MIRACLES,
                           P/UBLISHED BY\
                         DAVID HUME, <Esq>;
                           A/MONGST HIS\
                      P/HILOSOPHICAL\ ESSAYS.

                             <LONDON:>
 Printed for G. W/OODFALL\, at <Charing-Cross>; and C. Corbett, in
                          <Fleet-Street>.

                       (Price One Shilling).

{5}

                              REMARKS
                                 ON
                         Mr. <HUME>'s ESSAY
                            C/ONCERNING\
                             MIRACLES.


     MR. <Hume> professedly [2]"flatters himself that he has
discovered an Argument, which, if just, will be an everlasting Check
to all Kinds of superstitious Delusion; and consequently will be
useful as long as the World lasts; for so long he presumes will the
Accounts of Miracles and Prodigies be found in all <Profane
History>."  In which Declaration the two last Words may seem
designed to give us the Satisfaction of Thinking, that this new
Argument, great as it is to be in its Effects, yet will not extend
to the Miracles related by the <Sacred Writers>.  For if he thought
it would take in them as well as others, why did he speak only of
profane History, and not of History in general?  His Addition of
<profane>, which is an Epithet of Restriction, implies an Opposition
to sacred History with Regard to the Miracles which it relates, as
being unconcerned in what was to be advanced. {6}
     But whatever may be inferred from the Propriety of his
Expression, the Author's true Meaning was not to exempt the Miracles
in the holy Scriptures, any more than others, from the Force of his
Argument, which is formed upon Principles that extend alike to all
Miracles whatsoever; and his Conclusions from those Principles admit
of no Exception.  "Upon the whole," says he, "it appears that no
Testimony for any Kind of Miracle can ever possibly amount to a
<Probability>, much less to a <Proof>; and that even supposing it
amounts to a Proof, it would be opposed by another Proof derived
from the very Nature of the Fact which it would endeavour to
establish."  Again, "we may establish it as a Maxim, that no human
Testimony can have such a Force as to prove a Miracle, and make it a
just Foundation for any such System of Religion."  And a little
before, he had expressed himself in Terms yet stronger, but less
decent where he scruples not to say, "that a Miracle supported by
any human Testimony is more properly a Subject of Derision than of
Argument."  Accordingly, he flouts at the Miracles related by
<Moses> in the <Pentateuch>; he says, "that the Christian Religion
not only was at first attended with Miracles, but even at this Day
cannot be believed by any reasonable Person without one;" yet the
Miracles he there means were not those that are delivered to us in
the holy Scripture, but some Effects on the Minds of Men, which he,
in a popular Sense of the Word, is pleased to call Miracles, but
which he conceives are far from according either Evidence or Credit
to the Gospel.
     Now as it is plain, that if this was really the Design of his
Essay, it strikes at the Foundation of our Religion, by denying the
Truth of all the Miracles wrought by <Christ> to prove that he was
sent from God; it seems to be the Concern of all who believe in him,
and are able to examine the Arguments of this Author, to satisfy
themselves as to what there is in them.  And the following Remarks,
though at first designed only {7} for <private> Use, are now offered
to the Public, because they consider this Essay in Views, somewhat
different from those of the learned Persons who have answered it
before, and are drawn into so small a Compass, that any Reader,
without employing much Time or Pains, may be able to judge how far
they answer their End.
     The main Design of Mr. <Hume>'s first Argument, is to shew that
no human Testimony can be sufficient to prove the Reality of any
Miracle, or make it justly Credible; in order to which, he begins
with considering on what Grounds the Credibility of human Testimony
itself depends.  And he observes, "that our Assurance of the Truth
of any Argument, founded only on human Testimony, is derived from no
other Principle than our Observation of the Veracity of that
Testimony in general, and of the usual Conformity of Facts to the
Reports of Witnesses."  And, "Did not Men's Imagination naturally
follow their Memory; had they not commonly an Inclination to Truth,
and a Sentiment of Probity; were they not sensible to Shame when
detected in a Falsehood; were not these, I say, discovered to be
Qualities inherent in human Nature, we should never repose the least
Confidence in human Testimony.  A Man delirious or noted for
Falsehood and Vanity has no Manner of Weight or Authority with us."
     It is here laid down that these Qualities and Dispositions,
known to be inherent in human Nature, will cause Men to speak the
Truth, unless accidental and sinister Motives hinder them from doing
it.  And about <this>, I have no Dispute with the Author:  Yet must
observe, that he has omitted the principal Thing that ought to have,
and no doubt often has, the <greatest Weight> in disposing Men to
speak as they think; and that is, <their Sense> of the <Obligation>
which <God> lays them under to do it, and their Fear of Punishment
from him, if they act contrary to this Obligation.  Every one who
reflects at all, must be sensible that God was the Author of our
Faculty of Speech, and that he gave it, in order to the Benefit and
Improvement that Men might receive by imparting their Thoughts and
{8} Dispositions to each other.  For which Purpose, it is necessary
that their Words should express their Thoughts as they really are;
because if they did otherwise, their Speech would produce frequently
Distrust, Ill-Will and Disturbance among them.  On which Account we
may justly conclude, from Reason itself, that God has strictly
obliged each Person to speak the Truth; that he has given all others
a Right to expect it from him; and that he himself, who always knows
how far their Words are expressive of their Thoughts, will severely
punish all Breaches of this Duty.  This <Sense> of natural
Obligation, attended with the Fear of Punishment from him, and of
Resentment from Men, in Case of speaking falsely, I say, every one
must have in some Degree:  I ought to be, and must be, one of his
chief Motives to say what he thinks.  For this Reason, I cannot
easily conceive how the Author came to omit it, and instead of it,
to talk of "<Men's Imagination as naturally following their
Memories>," which is a Thing not easy to be understood, if it be at
all to the Purpose.
     But, taking this Matter as the Author has put it, let us see
how he proceeds upon it.  He observes that

     "as the Evidence derived from Witnesses and human Testimony is
     founded on past Experience, so it varies with the Experience,
     and is regarded as a Proof or Probability, according as the
     Conjunction betwixt any particular Kind of Report, and any Kind
     of Objects has been found to be constant or variable.  There
     are a Number of Circumstances to be taken into Consideration in
     all Judgments of this Kind; and our ultimate Standard, by which
     we determine all Disputes that may arise concerning them, is
     always derived from Experience and Observation.  When this
     Experience is not entirely uniform on any Side, it is attended
     with an unvariable Contrariety in our Judgments, and with the
     same Opposition and mutual Destruction of Argument as in every
     other Kind of Evidence."

He observes farther,

     "that many Particulars may destroy the Force of any Argument
     derived from human Testimony, the Character and Number of the
     Witnesses, the Manner of their delivering their Testimony, {9}
     or the Union of all these Circumstances.  We entertain a
     Suspicion concerning any Matter of Fact, when the Witnesses
     contradict each other, when they are but few, or of a
     suspicious Character, when they have an Interest in what they
     affirm, when they deliver their Testimony with Doubt and
     Hesitation, or on the contrary with too violent Asseverations."

     But one Thing the Author distinguishes from the others, which
diminish the Force of human Testimony; because it is much of the
same Nature with the principal Circumstance on which his Argument
against that Testimony, in the Case of Miracles, will be founded.
He tells us,

     "that when the Fact which the Testimony endeavours to establish
     partakes of the <extraordinary> and the <marvellous>, the
     Evidence resulting from the Testimony, receives a Diminution
     greater or less in Proportion as the Fact is more or less
     Unusual.  The Reason why we place any Credit in Witnesses and
     Historians is not from any Connexion we perceive <a priori>
     betwixt Testimony and Reality, but because we are accustomed to
     find a Connexion betwixt them.  But when the Fact attested, is
     such as has seldom fallen under our Observation, here is a
     Contest of two opposite Experiences, of which the one destroys
     the other as far as its Force goes, and the superior can only
     operate on the Mind by the Force which remains.  The very same
     Principle of Experience which gives us a certain Degree of
     Assurance against the Fact which they endeavour to establish;
     from which Contradiction there necessarily arises a
     Counterpoise and mutual Destruction of Belief and Authority."

     The Reader, I fear, will begin to be tired with such long
Quotations, in which but little of the Argument expected hitherto
appears:  And, indeed, on that Account, I thought of trying whether
the Substance of these and other Observations, to the same Effect,
might not be drawn into a lesser Compass.  But I quitted that Design
upon considering, that an Author's {10} Sense may be misrepresented
or weakened by another, even without any Design to do it.  On which
Account those Readers who desire to form an impartial Judgment, and
may not have an Opportunity to see the Author's Book, will probably
chuse to have his Sentiments expressed in his own Words.  I beg
Leave therefore, to proceed with them, as they immediately follow
those cited above, and are indeed, a proper Illustration to them.

          "The <Indian> Prince, says our Author, who refused to
     believe the first Relations concerning the Effects of Frost,
     reasoned justly; and it naturally <required very strong
     Testimony to engage his Assent> to Facts which arose from a
     State of Nature with which he was unacquainted, and bore so
     little Analogy to those Events of which he had had constant and
     uniform Experience.  Though they were <not contrary to his
     Experience, they were not conformable to it>."
          "But in order to increase the Probability against the
     Testimony of Witnesses, let us suppose, that the Fact which
     they endeavour to establish, instead of being only Marvellous,
     is really Miraculous; and suppose also that the Testimony
     considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire Proof; in
     that Case, there is Proof against Proof, of which the strongest
     must prevail, but still with a Diminution of its Force in
     Proportion to that of its Antagonist."

     And now, at length, we come to that important Argument for
which all great Preparation has been made.  "A Miracle," says our
Author,

     "is a Violation of the Laws of Nature; and as a <firm and
     unalterable Experience has established those Laws>, the Proof,
     from the very Nature of the Fact, is as entire as any Argument
     from Experience can possibly be imagined.  There must be an
     <uniform Experience against every miraculous Event>, otherwise
     the Event would not merit that Appellation.  And as an <uniform
     Experience amounts to a Proof>, there is here a direct and full
     <Proof> from the Nature of the {11} Fact against the Existence
     of any Miracle; nor can such a Proof be destroyed, or the
     Miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite Proof that is
     superior."

     In order to judge of the Force of this Argument, the first
Thing to be considered is, what the Author means by saying that <a
firm and unalterable Experience has established the Laws of Nature>.
Does he mean that our constant Experience assures us what Laws are
<actually settled> for the general Order and Government of the
material World?  Or does he mean that the same Experience assures us
that those Laws are <so absolutely fixed> that they never can be
suspended for any Time, or on any Occasion?  His speaking of an
Experience be strictly speaking unalterable, the Laws of Nature
themselves must be so too, at least during our Time; and he could
not well think that they are more unalterable in this Age, than they
have been, and will continue to be in all others.  Now if he meant
that those Laws are unalterable at all Times, and could make good
his Assertion, there would need no other Proof against the
Possibility of Miracles.  For if the Laws of Nature were
<unalterably fixed>, the Consequence is plain, that every Miracle,
which implies at least a temporary Suspension of those Laws, or an
Effect contrary to them, would be impossible.  But I think this can
hardly be our Author's Meaning; because a Person of his Capacity
must have seen that our Experience cannot be a sufficient Proof that
the Laws of Nature are unalterably fixed.  It does, indeed, prove
that certain Laws are settled by God for the Government of the
material World, and that they are highly expedient to it.  From
whence it is certain that he will not alter nor break in upon them
without some Reason of great Importance.  But that he will never
suspend those Laws on any Occasion, nor permit that any other
invisible Beings should ever act so as to interrupt them in their
ordinary Course, our Experience is far from being able to prove;
unless it could discover that either he has made an absolute Decree
against all such Proceedings, or that they must have Consequences
some Way repugnant {12} to his Perfections; both which, are
Discoveries that neither our Experience, nor even our Reason will
ever make.
     Indeed, Mr. <Hume> appears to have been so far sensible of
this, that he does not attempt to prove directly against the
<Possibility> of its being <sufficiently proved by any human
Testimony>.  This latter Point he knew would serve his Purpose as
well as the former, and he thought it might be more easily
maintained.  He therefore attempts it by comparing our Experience
upon which the Credibility of human Testimony depends, with an
opposite Experience which he supposes us to have against Miracles;
and imagining that this latter Experience is much the more uniform
and constant of the two, he, according to his Rule before laid down,
that in our Judgments of Things we are to be governed by our
strongest Experience, determines that Miracles can never be rendered
credible by any human Testimony whatever.
     But in order to see the Weakness of this reasoning, let us
enquire what the Author means by <Experience against Miracles>.  The
Word Experience supposes the Existence present or past, of some
Facts or Events as the Objects of it; for Experience of Things that
have never been, is a Contradiction in the Terms, and therefore it
cannot be properly said that we have had, or can have, any
<Experience against Miracles>.  Mr. <Hume> perhaps will say, that an
Experience of the unvaried Continuance of the Laws of Nature is, in
Effect, the same Thing as an Experience against Miracles, though the
latter Expression may not be quite proper.  I answer, that it is not
the same Thing as to the Force of his Argument; for <that> requires
an Experience which can yield such an <Evidence against Miracles> as
may justly be Opposed to, and in Strength will exceed the <Evidence
for them>, which arises from the Credibility of human Testimony
grounded on Experience. But our Experience of the unvaried
Continuance of the Laws of Nature cannot yield any such Evidence
against Miracles; for, as I have before said, it can only prove that
no Miracles have been in our Time. But {13} from thence it does not
follow, nor can it possibly by this Medium be proved, that no
Miracles have been, or can be, at all. Now, if our Experience, with
regard to Miracles, is no Proof that there cannot be any such, then
this Experience can neither be superior in Strength, nor be any way
<Opposed>, to the Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony,
which affirms that there have been frequent Miracles. And if our
Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony be <not Exceeded>,
nor even <Opposed> by any other Experience with regard to Miracles,
then, the former of these Experiences remains, in its full Strength,
on Behalf of the Credibility of human Testimony with regard to
Miracles. From whence it follows that when that Testimony is given
by Persons fitly qualified, by their Knowledge, and their Veracity,
we ought to believe it with regard to Miracles as well as to other
more common Events.
     Mr. <Hume> allows this to be true, in the Case of the <Indian>
Prince abovementioned, with regard to the Accounts given him of the
Effects of Frosts in cold Climates. That Prince might have argued
against the Credibility of those Accounts, exactly as our Author
does against the Credibility of Miracles. He might have alledged his
own Experience, and that of all other Persons in his Country, to
prove that the Fluidity of Water was a constant unvaried Phaenomenon
or Law of Nature. It had never been known to become a solid Body, on
which Men, unsupported by any thing else, might walk without
sinking; nor did it seem <capable> of becoming such a one. Now this
their constant Experience about it, was of much greater Force to
prove that it never could become solid, than any human Testimony,
the Credibility of which is grounded on a <lesser> Experience, could
be to prove that it ever <had been> solid: And therefore, this
Prince, according to Mr. <Hume>'s Way of Reasoning, might have
justly refused to believe that Water had ever been actually frozen
into a solid Body, though this Fact had been affirmed to him by any
Persons, however numerous, or however great seeming Probity. {14}
     Yet this Author intimates plainly enough, that <very strong
Testimony might justly> have engaged the Prince's Assent to these
Accounts of the Effects of Frost: For though they were not
conformable to his Experience, <yet they were not contrary to it>.
The last Expression, as it came from Mr. <Hume>, has, indeed, a
little different Turn, but is, in effect, the same with <this>. And
his Observation is certainly right; for the Prince neither had had,
nor could have, any Experience that Water could not be frozen to
Solidity. All that his Experience amounted to, was, that Water <had
never been> actually solid, within his Knowledge or Observation; but
this was no Proof from Experience that it could not ever have been
so. There was no Experience in this Case that <could be Opposed> to
the Experience for the Credibility of human Testimony. And therefore
such Testimony, when strong, as it ought to be, in Proportion to the
extraordinary Nature of the Fact related, must have remained in its
full genuine Force, and was therefore justly credible, and capable
of rendering the Fact related credible to the Prince. Now as Mr.
<Hume> saw the Justness of this Reasoning in the Case before us, so
he ought to have seen it, with regard to the Credibility of
<Miracles> upon sufficient human Testimony. For the Reasoning is
exactly the same in both. There is <no more Experience> to any one
<against Miracles>, than there was to the <Indian> Prince <against
the Effects of Frost>. And since there is no such <Experience> to be
<Opposed> to that <Experience>, upon which the Credibility of human
Testimony is grounded, that Testimony ought to have its <full Force>
in the Proof of <Miracles>, as well as of any other Events.
     Having made these Remarks upon the only Argument which Mr.
<Hume> has urged against Miracles in the first Part of his Essay, I
proceed to the second, in which we meet with another Argument of the
like Kind, in the following Words:

     "There is no Testimony," says he, Page 190, for any Prodigies,
     even those which have not been expressly detected that is not
     opposed by an infinite Number of Witnesses; so that not only
     the Miracle destroys the Credit of the Testimony, but even the
     Testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood,
     let us {15} consider that in Matters of Religion whatever is
     <different> is <contrary>, and that it is impossible that the
     Religions of ancient <Rome>, of <Turkey>, or <Siam>, and of
     <China> should all of them be established on any solid
     Foundation; every Miracle therefore pretended to have been
     wrought in any of these Religions, (and all of them abound in
     Miracles) as its direct Scope, is to establish the particular
     System to which it is attributed, so it has the same Force,
     though more indirectly, to overthrow every other System; in
     destroying a rival System, it likewise destroys the Credit of
     those Miracles on which that System was established; so that
     all the Prodigies of different Religions are to be considered
     as contrary Facts, and the Evidences of these Prodigies whether
     weak or strong, as opposite to each other. According to his
     Method of reasoning, when we believe any Miracle of <Mohamet>
     or any of his Successors, we have for our Warrant the Testimony
     of a few barbarous <Arabians>, and on the other Side, we are to
     regard the Authority of <Titus Livius>, <Plutarch>, <Tacitus>,
     and in short, of all the Authors and Witnesses <Grecian,
     Chinese>, and <Roman-Catholick>, who have related any Miracle
     in their particular Religion, I say, we are to regard their
     Testimony in the same Light as if they had mentioned that
     <Mahometan> Miracle, and had in express Terms contradicted it
     with the same Certainty as they have for the Miracles they
     relate. This Argument may appear over subtle and refined; but
     it is not in Reality different from the reasoning of a Judge,
     who supposes that the Credit of two Witnesses maintaining a
     Crime against any one, is destroyed by the Testimony of two
     others who affirm him to have been two hundred Leagues distant
     at the same instant when the Crime is said to have been
     committed."

     At the Beginning of this Argument there are some Propositions
about which I shall not dispute with the Author: They are, First,
That in Religion whatever is different is contrary, and that,
therefore no two opposite Religions can be both of them true.
Secondly, That every Miracle wrought in Support of any Religion, not
only tends directly to prove the {16} Truth of that Religion, but
also tends though more indirectly, to disprove all other Religions.
Thirdly, That every Miracle, while it tends to disprove the Truth of
any different Religion, does likewise disprove the Truth of all the
Miracles pretended to have been wrought on Behalf of that Religion.
The last of these Propositions indeed, ought not to have been
advanced without some Proof; for the Author must have known that
both the <Jewish> and <Christian> Religions[3] suppose that some
Miracles have been, and may be wrought in Religions opposite to
them; and of consequence, must suppose, that their own Miracles do
not effectually disprove the Reality of those other Miracles. The
Reasons they give why God sometimes permits Miracles to be wrought
in false Religions, are, that he does it to try the good
dispositions of Men in the true one, and to put them upon a more
careful Examination of the Nature and external Evidences of it;
which Reasons this Author would not have been able to confute; and
on that Account, perhaps has declined to consider them, as he
likewise has forborne attempting to prove that all Miracles in
opposite Religions <are incompatible with each other>; though this
is the necessary foundation upon which his present Argument is
raised, and without it, must immediately fall to the Ground.
     However, that we may see what a Structure he can make if this
Foundation be allowed, let us pass over his third Proposition as
well as the two former without any Dispute. Now his reasoning from
them is to this Effect: Because the Testimony for the Miracles in
any Religion tends to disprove, as far as it can, all the
Testimonies for the Miracles in every one of the different
Religions, the Consequence is, that the Testimony in Behalf of the
Miracles in every particular Religion is opposed by an <infinite>
Number of Witnesses, whose Testimony being very much stronger than
the Testimony for the Miracles in any such particular Religion can
be; on this Account, no Testimony of this Kind can ever make the
Miracles pretended to have been wrought in any such Religion be
justly credible. {17} To illustrate this Doctrine, our Author
supposes us to have an Account of a Miracle performed by <Mahomet>,
or one of his Successors; and that for our Warrant in believing it,
we have the Testimony of a few barbarous <Arabians>; while, on the
other Hand, we have, against it, the Authority of <Titus Livius,
Plutarch, Tacitus>, and in short, of all the Authors and Witnesses,
<Grecian, Chinese>, and <Roman Catholic>, who have related any
Miracle in their particular Religion: For the Testimony of all
these, "must be regarded," says he, "in the same Light, as if they
had mentioned that <Mahometan> Miracle, and had in express Terms,
contradicted it, with the same Certainty, as they have for the
Miracle they relate."
     These Suppositions and Assertions may, at first Sight, appear
very unaccountable: For how can <Livy, Plutarch> or <Tacitus> be
regarded as Witnesses against a <Mahometan> Miracle, which, if such
a one had ever been, could not have been wrought till some hundreds
of Years after they all were dead? Or how can even the <Grecians>,
the <Chinese>, or <Roman Catholics> be considered as giving
Testimony against the same Miracle, of which our Author does not
seem to suppose that they had ever known or heard any Thing at all?
But in order to do him Justice, the Reader must observe, that all
these Persons are, and great Numbers of others might have been
alledged as Witnesses against it, in Consequence of his Reasoning
here before mentioned; which is, that because no two Miracles in
different Religions can, both of them be true; therefore, the
Testimony of the <Grecians>, the <Chinese>, and all the rest, for
the Miracles, in their several Religions, must really opposed, and,
as far as the Strength of their Evidence will go, must tend to
disprove the Testimony of the <Mahometans> for the Miracle pretended
to be wrought in Behalf of their Religion. And, indeed, since this
Reasoning proceeds upon the Author's third Proposition at the
Beginning of this Argument, which I have passed over without
disputing it, I am now obliged to allow the Reasoning to be so far
<conclusive> as it aims at proving that the Testimony in every
particular Religion, the <Mahometan> for Instance, is virtually
opposed by the Testimony for the {18} Miracles in all other
Religions, whether these latter Witnesses ever <knew> any Thing
against the <Mahometan> Testimony or not.
     But such a merely consequential Opposition of all the
Testimonies for the Miracles in all the different Religions, will
not be sufficient for our Author's Purpose of disproving the
<Mahometan> Miracle. He must go somewhat further, and shew, either,
first, that some one of the opposite Testimonies is really, in
itself, stronger than what there is for the <Mahometan> Miracle: Or,
secondly, that since all these several Testimonies, are alike
virtually opposite to the Testimony for that Miracle, there may, by
an Alliance or Union of them, be a Testimony formed against it, of
much greater Strength than its Testimony has; and which, therefore,
will destroy the Credibility of it.
     Our Author seems to have declined insisting on the former of
these Points; because though he might have shewn in some one of the
Regions opposite to the <Mahometan>, a Miracle that had a Testimony
<for it> stronger than this has; yet he might not be able to shew so
much in the Case of <another> Religion which seems to have been
chiefly in his View, though he would not here mention it. He could
hardly hope to find in any of the Religions opposite to this latter,
a Testimony superior to that by which a very remarkable Miracle in
it is supported. And therefore he chose a Way of arguing that he
thought would not fail to prove as well against <this> Religion, as
against the <Mahometan>, and, indeed, would prove, in general,
against all the pretended to be grounded on divine Revelation. To
this End, he had Recourse to that <infinite Number of Witnesses>
which might be drawn together from all the Religions opposite to the
<Mahometan>, or to any other that he should have a Mind to disprove;
in order, from this Collection of them, to make up a united or
aggregate Testimony that should be plainly superior in Strength to
any Testimony that could ever be alledged from the Miracles in any
single Religion. {19}
     But however plausible this Scheme may have appeared to Mr.
<Hume>, it is nothing but a Fallacy, and can have no Effect. We
shall plainly see this, if we consider that, supposing, a Miracle
related to us has been <possible> in itself, the <Credibility of the
Persons> by whom it is attested, must always depend, on the
Opportunities they have had to know the Nature and Circumstances of
the Fact; on their Abilities to judge well of it; on their Character
for Veracity, in declaring exactly whatever they know or believe
about it; and on their Number and Agreement with each other. In
Proportion as these Circumstances appear to have been more or less
in their Case, they will be more or less credible. But whatever the
Degree of their Credibility is, common Sense plainly dictates that
it must depend solely <upon themselves>, and cannot be either
increased or diminished by the Testimony of any other Persons who
have never known or heard of the Miracle in Question, but only
attest some other Miracles different in all Respects from this. The
Credibility of the <Persons> who relate a Miracle supposed to have
been done in <China>, can neither be impaired, nor can it be
increased, by the Credibility of any other Persons who relate a
Miracle done in <Italy>. As each of these Credibilities has been
derived merely from the Circumstances and Dispositions peculiar to
the Persons concerned in each Testimony, and who on either Side are
supposed to be quite Strangers to the others, and to the Fact
attested by them, it is therefore, impossible that either of these
Credibilities can be rendered greater, than it is in itself, by any
Conjunction it can have with the other. For no Man can imagine that
personal Circumstances, Abilities, and Dispositions can be
transferred, or in any Degree imparted from the one Set of these
distant Witnesses to the other. You might well think of adding to
the Number, by putting Cyphers to the left of it, or of lengthening
a Line, by adding a Sound or a Colour to it, as of increasing the
Credibility of the <Chinese> Witness, by adding the Credibility of
the <Italians> to it. {20}
     Which Consideration plainly shews, that though indeed the
Testimonies for <both> these Miracles may be, in <one Respect,
opposed> to the Testimony for the <Mahometan> Miracle; yet neither
of those former Testimonies can ever receive, <except in one Case
only>, any increase of its Credibility from the other of them, so as
that both will, on that Account, become more credible, in Opposition
to the <Mahometan>, than either of them would have been alone. The
case that I except is, when any of the Witnesses for each of these
two opposite Miracles are supposed to have known Circumstances of
the same, or a like Nature, that concern the <Mahometan>, or the
Witnesses to it; and tend to detract form the Credibility of either
of them. In that Case, indeed, the Credibility of each of these two
Sets of opposite Witnesses would be <increased> by the Addition of
the other, considered as being <opposed>, in <Conjunction with it>,
to the Testimony for the <Mahometan> Miracle: And the Credibility of
this latter would be impaired more by such an Alliance or Union of
those Testimonies, than by either of them singly, in Opposition to
it: And so, more still, in Proportion, if there were a greater
Number of Testimonies, <of this Nature>, against it.
     But if no one of the opposite Witnesses declares any Thing, in
particular, against the Credibility of the <Mahometan> Miracle, or
appears to know any Thing of it, or of the Witnesses on its behalf;
in this Case, how many soever these opposite Witnesses may be, their
Number will avail nothing against it; in Regard that their
Testimonies can not be united, nor their Credibility by that means,
be increased. They can only act by the single Weight of each,
compared, as to its Credibility, with the Testimony for that
<Mahometan> Miracle. Upon which Comparison, indeed, any one of them
that is found its superior in Credibility, will prevail and disprove
it. But in doing this, it can receive no Advantage from the
<infinite Number> of the <Witnesses> that, merely by Virtue of our
Author's Reasoning, are joined with it in a virtual Opposition to
that Miracle:  For a Conjunction of this Sort can have no Effect at
all, either upon the Credibility {21} of the several Testimonies so
drawn together, or on that of the <Mahometan> Miracle whose
Testimony they oppose.
     It is evident, therefore, that this supposed <infinite Number
of Witnesses>, raised by Mr. <Hume>, in Opposition to that Miracle,
and by a Parity of Reason, to any other which he intends to
disprove, is mere Amusement.  Whatever Witnesses there are who
really know any Thing against such a one, they would be of as much
Force as they can ever be, without this consequential joint
Opposition; and those that know nothing of <this> Miracle will do it
no harm, however, great Numbers of them may be brought to make their
Appearance for that Purpose.  They are like separate Parties of
Troops which make a great Shew in the Field of Battle, by appearing
all on the same Side; but can never be drawn into one Body, nor made
to charge the Enemy together, but act singly by themselves, with
only their own unassisted Force; and therefore, if each of them be
weaker than the Enemy, there can be no Prospect that they will ever
prevail.  But quitting this Simile, and the Argument itself, which I
hope has been set in its proper Light; I only beg leave, on this
Occasion, to make one general Remark:  It is, that the Interests of
Truth and Virtue, which undoubtedly are the most valuable Blessings
in human Life, would be in a much better State that they are, if Men
of Letters would be more cautious how they lay a Stress upon novel
Arguments of their own Growth, against any Points of Moment in
Religion; and especially how they, by making them public, throw them
into the Hands of Persons of all Ranks, who are Dabblers in Reading.
There are, in the present Age, great Numbers of People who answer to
the Character given by <St. Paul>,[4] <2 Timothy 3:7>.  <That they
are ever Learning, and never able to come to the Knowledge of the
Truth>; because indeed they are not disposed[5] to receive {22} it.
These Persons are always ready to be taken by any new Conceit,
especially if it be to the Disadvantage of Religion.  But to
consider, with proper Care, what is said in answer to such
Objections, is a Talk for which they seldom have any Inclination, or
at least not enough to make them go through with it; and so, the ill
Impressions they have received continue upon them:  Their Faith is
subverted, and their Morals often ruined in consequence of it.
     This was an Effect that generally followed upon the sceptical
Discourses of some Philosophers among the <Greeks>, in Opposition to
the great Principles of Religion and Morality.  <Socrates>[6]
observed it with very much Concern; and accordingly declared, that
every one ought to be extremely cautious how he treated Points of
such high Importance, especially in publick.  And he himself gave an
Example of it, expressing great Diffidence of his own Abilities when
he was to speak of the <chief Good>,[7] of the Nature of the
<supreme Being>, or of any other such Subjects.  And in Pursuance of
his Advice, one of his Friends, before he entered on a Discourse of
this Nature, expressed himself in these following Terms.  [Greek
quote][8] <Plat. in Timae>, p. 1059. If some of our modern Authors
had taken a Course like this, before they fate themselves to write
or publish their Thoughts upon Matters of Religion, the World
perhaps would not have been troubled with so many of their crude and
false Notions; which, though sufficiently answered, have yet had a
pernicious Effect in corrupting the Principles and Morals of our
Nation. {23} But be Good Men, will easily learn the Way to be so.
One sees how agreeable this Observation, made by two of the greatest
Men among the antient Heathens, is to what was delivered afterwards
by the highest Authority, <John 7:17>.  <If any Man will do His
[God's] Will, he shall know of the Doctrine, whether it be of God,
or whether I speak of myself>.
     But to return from this Digression to Mr. <Hume> and his Essay,
I have considered all that Part of it which contains any Argument;
the rest of it consists either of Assertions destitute of Proofs, or
of Observations from which nothing can be justly concluded, and
which tend to nothing but to raise undue Prejudices in the Minds of
weak Readers.  Of this latter Kind are our Author's Observations.
He acquaints us in a great Number of Words, that Men are generally
apt to be pleased at hearing extraordinary and wonderful Things;
that some may be Enthusiasts; others may think they do right in
telling Lies for the Advantage of their Religion; Vanity and
Interest may be to others, their Motives for endeavouring its
Propagation; they may be encouraged in attempting to do it be the
Credulity and Weakness of those Persons to whom they apply.  That if
they have Eloquence, Craft and Address, they may be likely to work
upon illiterate and barbarous People, as <Lucian>'s <Alexander> did
on the <Paphlagonians>.  That Accounts of Miracles have chiefly
abounded among ignorant and barbarous Nations, and after they have
received there for some Time, it has been difficult to detect the
Falsity of them; that Men are disposed to say Things, which tend to
the Honour of their own Country or Families; that if they have
Opportunities, they may easily be tempted to assume the high
Character of Missionaries from Heaven; and when they have done so,
may bear many Distresses in order to maintain it.
     Most of these Observations, may in some Cases, have been true.
But what just Consequences can be drawn from them against the
Credibility of <all> human Testimony when alledged in Proof of
Miracles?  If <some> Men be weak or ill-disposed, must <all>
therefore be so?  Were there never any Men of good Sense or Probity?
Is there not very great Reason to believe that some such there have
been in every Age, as there are in the present?  Have not
indisputable Proofs been given by Witnesses, in some Cases, of their
Integrity, their good Judgment, and their perfect Knowledge of the
Things they related?  If these Facts are beyond Question, what
Advantage {24} can our Author gain, by observing that there have
also been great Numbers of <Knaves> and <Fools> in the World?  His
Design is to insinuate, that the <Witnesses> to <all> the
<Religions> that have pretended to be divine Revelations, were
Persons of one or other of the last mentioned Characters.  But every
Eye must be able to discern that there is not the least Consequence
in this Sort of Reasoning, which really does not deserve that Name.
     And this Author's <Assertions> are not better grounded.  He
affirms, "that there is not to be found in all History, any Miracle
attested by a sufficient Number of Men, and with such other
Circumstances as are requisite to give us a full Assurance of the
Truth of their Testimony."  This is an Assertion which is hardly
<capable> of a <due Proof>.  For in order to a compleat one, this
Author is obliged to consider and disprove <all> the several
Evidences that have ever been given for <all> the Miracles of which
we have any Account>  And this, I think, he has hardly yet done, or
is likely to do soon.  At least in this Essay, he has not attempted
any Thing material to this Purpose.  His Assertion remains entirely
<unproved>, and therefore, cannot, with Reason, be allowed any
Weight.
     However, as it is an express Declaration of his own Opinion
about the Testimony for <all Miracles>, which, without any
Exception, he reckons insufficient to prove, or render them
credible; we may from thence be led to ask, <For what Purpose> he
has mentioned the Miracle related by <Tacitus>, as having been
wrought by the elder <Vespasian>; or the marvellous Creation of a
new Leg, to a Man at <Saragossa>, by the Use of the holy Oil; of the
numerous Miracles ascribed by the <French> Jansenists to their <Abbe
Paris>?  Since <he> plainly looked upon all these, as false Stories
and Impostures, why did he trouble his Readers with Accounts of
them?  I must be so free as to tell Mr. <Hume>, that the Respect due
to <Mankind>, and much more to GOD and his sacred Truth, ought to
hinder an Author from publishing any Thing, especially on Subjects
that concerns Religion, but what he either knows, or on reasonable
Grounds, believes to be true.  He ought {25} not to make Use of that
very unfair, though sometimes indeed too effectual Method, of
raising <Prejudices> in weak Minds, against a Thing which cannot, by
Reason, be confuted.  If he thinks that the Testimony given for the
<Mosaic> or the <Christian> Miracles is not sufficient to satisfy
any reasonable Man, let him endeavour to disprove both it and them.
To those Objections which he has raised against the History of
<Moses>, let him add what others he can find or Form of a more solid
Kind.  But let him not take the low Way of <insinuating>, quite
without Proof, that the Evidence for the Miracles of <Moses> and of
<Christ> is not at all better than what has been given for those
other Miracles that he has mentioned; which is plainly his Design in
relating, with such an Air as he does, those notable Stories.  There
is no Sort of Reasoning, or Justness of Consequence in such
Comparisons or Insinuations.  They tend only to raise Prejudices
against the Truth, and to throw discolouring Lights upon it.  They
are therefore, unworthy of any Man who pretends to Religion, or even
to ordinary Probity and Candour.
     Which Censure I must, with Concern, affirm, is yet more due to
that Treatment almost beyond Parallel, which is given, soon after,
<more openly>, by this Author, to the <Christian> Religion and to
all who believe it.  He briefly resumes the Arguments, by which he
has attempted to prove, that "no Evidence for any Miracle can amount
to a Probability, much less to a Proof; and that, even supposing it
amounted to a Proof, it would be opposed by another Proof derived
from the very Nature of the Fact, which it would endeavour to
establish, &c."  After which, he insists on his Conclusion, and even
establishes it as a <Maxim>, that no human Testimony can have such
Force as to prove a Miracle, and make it a just Foundation for any
System of Religion, And "he is the better pleased," he says, "with
his own Reasoning, as he thinks it may serve to confound those
dangerous Friends or disguised Enemies to the <Christian> Religion
who have undertaken to defend it by the Principles of human Reason."
He himself affirms, "that <our most holy Religion> is founded in
<Faith>, <not in Reason>, and that it is a sure Method of <exposing
it>, to put it to such a Trial as it is by no Means fitted {26} to
endure."  His Meaning is, that <they> will indeed <effectually
expose it> who aim at proving, by the <Means> of <credible
Testimony>, that the Miracles said to have been wrought on its
Behalf, were rational and sufficient Proofs that it came from God.
For that, he pretends, is a Thing to be received by Faith alone,
without any Proof or Reason whatsoever.
     Yet presently afterwards, this Author Affirms, "that the
<Christian> Religion was not only at <first attended with Miracles>,
but even at this Day cannot be believed by any reasonable Person
without one.  Mere Reason is insufficient to convince us of its
Veracity; and whosoever is moved by Faith, to assent to it, is
conscious of a <continued Miracle in his own Person>."  Does there
no appear to be some Inconsistency in these Declarations?  No.  He
represents very plainly, all those who at first embraced what he
calls, with a Sneer, <our most holy> Religion, or who now believe
it, since they must do it entirely <without Reason>, "<to have
subverted all the Principles of their Understanding>," and says,
"that by believing what is most <contrary to Custom and Experience>,
they are Instances of <Miracles in their own Persons>."  Now what
<other Miracles> could <he> think <these> to be, after what he has
said through the whole Course of this Essay, but <prodigious
Effects> of Credulity and Folly?
     These last indeed, are not <his> Words; but that they express
his real Sense, an impartial Reader will easily perceive:  And when
such a one considers by WHOM, in this Nation, the <Christian>
Religion is publickly established, as well as professed, he will
know what to think of an Author, who <could> treat THEM in such a
Manner; and make such an Use of the valuable Liberty they are
pleased to allow Men of publishing their Thoughts on Religion
itself, as well as on all other Matters of Importance.  He will not
think it strange if a Person so disposed, should not be affected
either with the Doctrines of the <Christian> Religion, or the
Evidences for it.  Nor if another, to whom the Promises of the
Gospel are Objects of very pleasing Hopes, should have shewn some
Concern for its Vindication, when it has received such unworthy
Treatment.

                    The END




                              [NOTES]

     [1][COPYRIGHT: (c) 1995, James Fieser ([e-mail]), all
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citation: <Early Commentaries on Hume's Writings>, ed. James Fieser
(Internet Release, 1995).
     EDITORIAL CONVENTIONS: letters between slashes (e.g., H/UME\)
designate small capitalization. Letters within angled brackets
(e.g., <Hume>) designate italics. Note references are contained
within square brackets (e.g., [1]). Original pagination is contained
within curly brackets (e.g., {1}). Spelling and punctuation have not
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Bracketed comments within the end notes are the editor's. This is a
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     [2]Essay, 2d. Edit. <Lond>. M.DCC.LI. page 174.
     [3]See <Deuter>. xii. 1, 2, 3.
2 <Thess.> ii. 9, 10, 11, 12.
<Matt>. xxiv. 24, 25.
<Rev>. xii. 13, 14.
     [4]<Terence> describes such People with some Humour, in prolog.
<Andr. Faciunt nae intellegendo ut nihil intelegant>. They really
come to understand so, as to know nothing of the Matter.
     [5]<Socrates> used to say, as <Tully> quotes with Approbation,
<de Orat.> lib. i. <Quibus id persuasum est ut nihil mallent se esse
quam Bonos Viros, iis reliquam facilem esse [Virtutis] Doctrinam>.
They who have nothing more at heart than to be Good Men, will easily
learn the Way to be so. One sees how agreeable this Observation,
made by two ofthe greatest Men among the antient Heathens, is to
what was delivered afterwards by the highest Authority, <John> vii.
17. <If any Man will do His [God's] Will, he shall know of th
eDoctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself>.
     [6]<Plato, de Repub>. lib. vii. p. 708. Edit: Francof. M.DC.II.
     [7]<Plato, de Repub>. lib. vi. p. 506.
     [8]<After an address to> God the Saviour, <that he will
preserve us from saying any thing absurd or immoral, [and lead us]
to fit Opinions of Things, we begin again to speak>.